Two pressures toward religious pluralism are the variety of religious traditions which seem equally successful in the transformation of human lives and that apparently sincere and equally capable truth-seekers reach divergent conclusions about the nature of ultimate reality. I discuss Hick's Kantian explanation of these phenomena. I argue that his account is: neither the only nor the best account; furthermore that more reasonable accounts allow for the members of competing traditions to affirm the truth of their religious beliefs; and if Hick's explanation were accepted it would undermine the salvific power of the respective religious traditions.
true and, therefore, that all religious competitors are false smacks of arrogance and intolerance. Religious exclusivism also seems to make transformation a matter of luck --that is, if traditional Christianity, for example, is true then it is just a matter of luck that you happen to have been born to a conservative, Christian family in the heart of America; if you had been born in India, say, you more than likely would have been a Hindu. Momentous options, such as one's eternal destiny, ought not hang on the thin thread of chance.
If only one transformational system is true and outside of that transformational system none is saved, more people will be spiritually lost than not (assuming, as many religions claim, that most people have not availed themselves of the appropriate transformational system); this is a clearly undesirable state of affairs; the damnation of the vast majority of the peoples of the world and throughout history is indeed lamentable. If an explanation of religious diversity is forthcoming which is both likely to be true and is transformationally generous and inclusive, then it ought to be wholeheartedly embraced.
In this essay I shall discuss Hick's rather Kantian explanation of these phenomena. I shall argue that such an account of religious diversity is: (a) neither the only nor the best account. In addition I will argue that (b) a better account allows for the members of competing traditions to affirm the exclusive truth of their religious beliefs, and (c) if Hick's Kantian explanation were accepted it would undermine the transformational power of the respective religious traditions.
Before turning to criticisms of Hick's position, let us outline his Kantian explanation of religious diversity. Hick's understanding of religious diversity is called religious pluralism which he contrasts with exclusivism and inclusivism. Exclusivism is that view that transformation is restricted to a single group and that everyone outside of that group is excluded from transformation. Inclusivism is the view that while a single group may hold the correct view concerning the means of transformation (say that it is through the death of Jesus on the cross), the benefits of transformation are nonetheless available to those outside of that group (people can be washed in the blood of Jesus, even if they aren't aware of it); universalism is consistent with inclusivism.
Religious pluralism is thoroughly universalistic and affirms a plurality of transformational responses to the ultimate divine reality; each of the religious traditions is transformationally efficacious; none of the religious traditions is in a transformationally privileged position.
A universal affirmation of the various major religious traditions is the transcendence of divine Reality.
i Transcendence, according to Hick, is the view that the divine Reality "cannot be encompassed in human terms."
ii He distinguishes "the Real an sich (in him/her/itself) and the Real as humanly experienced and thought."
iii This divine Reality is one yet capable of being experienced in a multitude of ways. iv The variety of religious traditions is formed out of this awareness of the divine: "Our hypothesis is that they are formed by the presence of the divine Reality, this presence coming to consciousness in terms of the different sets of religious concepts and structures of religious meaning that operate within the different religious traditions of the world."
v Hick endorses an explicitly Kantian understanding of the distinction between the Real an sich and the real as humanly experienced. vi The Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena is apparent. We can have access to the phenomenal world of religious experience, of appearances as categorized by human cognitive powers, but not to the divine noumenal world. What we do not, indeed cannot, encounter in these experiences is Reality in itself.
The great virtue of Hick's metaphysics is that it makes most every religious tradition, in a sense, true. We can be wrong about reality claims, but how could we be wrong about how things appear to us? So God or the Absolute or the Whatever appears to some as personal, to others as impersonal and to others as non-existent. And each is right, insofar as their understanding of their beliefs does not extend beyond the terms of appearances. God appears to me, for example, to be personal (given my contingent location within a particular historico-cultural tradition). Religious assertions, properly translated into appearance language, are all true.
But this conceptual gain is bought with a price --no religious assertions, as claims about reality, are true. Indeed, they are either unjustified, false or meaningless insofar as they ascribe properties to God an sich. God may appear to us as loving, kind, The Epistemically Privileged Explanation allows both for some, albeit limited, access to the truth on the part of everyone and some, more privileged and extensive, access to the truth on the part of others (typically a minority); some people are simply in a better epistemic situation with respect to the divine Reality. But which are in this better cognitive position? Each of the major religions, of course, will claim that it is. If epistemic privilege has been granted to a single tradition, however, all of the other traditions will be wrong, at least on areas of disagreement to which the privileged few alone have been granted epistemic access. Again, which of those is in a better epistemic position with respect to God? From all appearances it is hard to tell. One might expect that the people within the tradition which has privileged access would be more transformationally successful. They, after all, have more truth and should have more means at their disposal of availing themselves of the truth in a transformationally advantageous manner. But, again, given the apparent success of the major religions in effecting at least significant moral improvement, it is difficult to appeal to transformational superiority in determining epistemic privilege.
One might contend that granting special access to the truth to some and not to others is gratuitous on the part of God and one would be right. This seems to make transformation more a matter of luck (aka providence) than seems appropriate for a loving God (which assumption cannot be affirmed on the Kantian view). It is probably no accident that certain forms of Christianity, say, have endorsed both the privileged epistemic access explanation and a strong view of predestination. These two views are not necessarily concomitant however. God may have granted special epistemic access to a certain group of people not simply to save them and to damn the remainder (who have, according to some views, insufficient knowledge for transformation but sufficient knowledge to be damned) but to make them responsible for the dissemination of such truths to the remainder. The privilege of extra divine information carries with it more peril --of failing in the corresponding obligation to share that knowledge. Or perhaps, given human weakness of will, any additional information about God simply increases one's opportunity for damnation. The increased knowledge of God may carry with it a burden which few can bear. Perhaps, therefore, it is more transformationally beneficial to have been granted only a bit of the divine by which to be judged than the whole lot given to the privileged who are doomed to failure. At any rate the Epistemically Privileged Explanation of the plurality of religions smacks of arbitrariness on the part of God and, given that transformational systems of competing religions are roughly equal in moral transformation, does not assist in determining which religion is true.
The moral of this section is clear: the diversity of religious beliefs, taken alone, underdetermines which of the above explanations is true. Each of these explanations adequately explains some forms of religious diversity and each has significant religious costs and benefits. Hick's Kantian explanation is successful in explaining the data but no more successful than any of the competing explanations. Unless one is committed a priori to a Kantian metaphysics/epistemology, and Hick has not argued on a priori grounds, the Kantian view has no explanatory advantage over its competitors. It is not arguably the best explanation and as I shall show in the next section it is arguably not the best explanation.
III
In the previous section I outlined four possible explanations of religious diversity. I can see no reason for not supposing that they are all roughly equally successful in explaining religious diversity and that none was any more successful at explaining the data than any other. Furthermore I can see no a priori reason for accepting one of the hypotheses over the others; that is, on logical or metaphysical grounds none of the explanations is to be preferred. Which explanation ought one accept? For reflective religious believers this is a matter of some urgency. At least one of the explanations, Hick's, contends that no religious beliefs are indicative of the divine reality; others, as exemplified in many of the world's great religions, exclude the vast majority from transformation. In this section I shall argue that it is reasonable for a religious believer to affirm one of the more realist explanations of religious diversity and that it is unreasonable for them to accept Hick's Kantian Explanation.
Hick's Kantian account of the varieties of equally transformational religious traditions is motivated in large part by his commitment to religious pluralism and not vice versa. Pressures of religious diversity drive the Kantian explanation; the Kantian explanation does not drive his views of religious diversity. He writes: "The hypothesis of an ultimate divine noumenon is arrived at inductively. We start from the phenomenological data of the forms of religious experience and thought presented by the history of religion. We then seek to interpret these data from the standpoint of the basic conviction that religious experience is not, as such and in toto, a realm of illusory projection but is also, at least in part, an effect within human consciousness of the presence and pressure of a transcendent divine Reality." How might such an inductive argument proceed? A well known theorem of the probability calculus is Bayes' theorem. Bayes' theorem is commonly used in confirmation theory and has been applied recently to the rational justification of beliefs.
Bayes' theorem is stated as follows (where h is the hypothesis in question, e is the relevant evidence, and k is general background knowledge):
For the purposes of this discussion let us take h to stand for one of the competing explanations of religious diversity, H 1 -H 4 . I will discuss shortly how we should understand k.
How should we understand the evidence of religious diversity, e? e can be taken in a variety of ways with varying strength and weakness. The weakest sense of religious diversity simply recognizes the obvious truth of widespread religious diversity:
The Weak Religious Diversity Claim (WRD): (a) Apparently sincere and equally cognitively capable truth-seekers reach widely divergent ("incompatible")
conclusions about the nature of ultimate reality. According to Bayes' theorem the probability of a hypothesis is determined by the hypothesis's explanatory power and its prior probability. Let us consider these in order.
(a) Explanatory Power. A hypothesis has explanatory power if it makes the evidence more likely than it would be in the absence of the hypothesis. This is indicated by:
The greater the likelihood of the evidence given the hypothesis, that is the greater P(e/h&k), the greater the explanatory power of a hypothesis. Also the more unlikely the evidence is on general background knowledge, the greater the explanatory power.
If the hypothesis only slightly raises the probability of the evidence over that given on background knowledge alone, that is if P(e/h&k) is only slightly greater than P(e/k), then the explanatory power of the hypothesis is only slight. Adjudged moral deficiencies would be attributed to lack of information and moral successes to sufficient information to allow for significant moral transformation.
Widely divergent religious beliefs would be attributed not to difference in the cognitive capabilities or to the lack of sincerity of the various inquirers, but to an increase of information on the part of one party of inquirers. There is another relevant factor in the determination of rationality as understood by the Bayesian. The hypothesis in question must not only explain otherwise inexplicable data, the hypothesis must also have:
(b) Prior Probability. According to Bayes' theorem, the hypothesis in question must have some antecedent likelihood given our general background knowledge. This is represented by the following portion of Bayes' Theorem:
What is the probability of the hypothesis in question given general background knowledge? There are many wildly implausible candidates for explanation of the data that are not considered worthy of rational scrutiny because they fail the test of prior probability. No matter how well they explain the data, when multiplied by the low probability assigned P(h/k), their consequent probability will be likewise low. This is analogous to William James's point that hypotheses for consideration must be living. Let us, therefore, expand k to include not only tautologies but all of our rationally justified beliefs. xix Why exclude any relevant evidence from the evaluation of hypotheses? If our goal is getting at the truth, then why not bring all that we know or justifiably believe to bear on the evaluation of hypotheses? This seems to me the strategy taken, for example, in science where one no longer seriously considers theories which postulate fairies, telepathic penguins, crystalline spheres or imponderable fluids.
The preference for naturalistic and mechanistic explanations is not justifiable on a priori grounds for tautologous evidence is indifferent to quarks and fairies; rather, plausibility judgments are made a posteriori on the basis of other propositions that one justifiably believes. Let us then expand k to include all relevant background beliefs. Thus expanded, k will allow one to sort amongst the competing hypotheses, H 1 -H 4, to determine plausible candidates for consideration.
Suppose that one is brought up in a particular religious tradition to hold certain beliefs about God, or that one comes to hold certain beliefs about God on the basis of a putative religious experience, or that one makes the considered and sober judgment that the best explanation of a variety of factors is that God, as described by a specific religious tradition, exists. In any of these cases one's belief in God as specified will be prima facie justified, or so it seems to me. Relevant justifying conditions include accepting things on the testimony of those whom one trusts, on the basis of experiences, or on the basis of inference to best explanation of a variety of data. In the case of religious belief, one typically affirms that God or Ultimate Reality really is or is like the way he or it have been described by one tradition or another. That is, most religious believers are realists concerning their beliefs about God or Ultimate Reality. If most believers have prima facie justified beliefs about God or Ultimate Reality that are realist in import, then it is appropriate for such believers to include such beliefs in their respective ks.
Consider once again The Weak Religious Diversity Claim (WRD). Suppose we
were evaluating H 1 , the Kantian Explanation of the Religious Diversity Claim. If k includes realistic beliefs about God then P(H 1 /k) will be low. And the consequent probability of H 1 , given WRD, will likewise be low. That is, it will not be reasonable, for one in this epistemic situation, to affirm H 1 . Three options remain for the religious Bayesian: The Cultural Filter Explanation, H 2 ; The Perversity Explanation, H 3 ; and The Epistemologically Privileged Explanation, H 4 . Given their roughly equal explanatory power with respect to WRD, which of these is reasonable for one to believe given WRD will, once again, be determined by one's justified background beliefs. If k includes justified beliefs about God (realistically construed) and about the lack of revelation granted to some people, then one may reasonably adjudge that P(H 4 /k) is high (relative to its competitors); if k includes justified beliefs about God (realistically construed) and attributes unbelief to pride, for example, one may reasonably adjudge that P(H 3 /k) is high (relative to its competitors). And considerations could likewise lead one to reasonably adjudge that P(H 2 /k) is high (relative to its competitors). Whichever hypothesis H 2 , H 3 or H 4 one adjudges as high given their k, one will also reasonably affirm as the best overall hypothesis for the explanation of the WRD.
The problem for Hick's Kantian Explanation, H 1, is this: if k rightly includes prima facie justified religious beliefs, most of which for most ordinary believers are realist, then it won't be rational for most believers to affirm that P(H 1 /k) is higher than P(H 2 /k), P(H 3 /k) or P(H 4 /k). Indeed they will affirm the opposite. And if so, it will not be reasonable, given that H 1 -H 4 explain equally well the WRD, for them to affirm By following a rational decision procedure, like Bayes' theorem, we may be able to determine which, of a competing set of hypotheses, is more likely given our current evidential state; which proposition is rightly adjudged more likely than its competitors will be a fortiori the more reasonable proposition for us to believe (on the assumption that we have paid due homage to defeaters). What should our stance be towards beliefs thus justified? Should we think our Bayesian justified beliefs are merely how things seem to us but not the way things really are? I think not. When we make judgments about which propositions are more likely than others, we are really inquiring into which beliefs are more likely to be true. There is a link between belief and truth: beliefs aim at the truth. Our beliefs are often our best assessment of the way things are. We believe because it seems to us that our beliefs are true, or likely to be true, or more likely to be true than their competitors. The telos of belief is truth. Bayesian rationality is our attempt, based on our total evidence, of gaining access to the truth. We should hold such justified beliefs to be true. What other stance should one hold towards one's beliefs? That they are false? If we believe something, we believe it to be true.
IV
We have seen that religious diversity can be taken in at least three ways --weak, moderate and strong. In this section I shall argue that, although SRD would require a shift in initial commitments for those who accept H 3 or H 4 , such people are not typically in a position to be rationally justified in accepting SRD; indeed, hardly anyone is in a position to accept SRD.
SRD requires that one make judgments not only about the moral practices of practitioners of various religious but also of their sincerity and character. One must adjudge that persons, who hold religious beliefs that are widely divergent from one's own, have undergone significant moral transformations. It is not sufficient to judge that such persons' outward actions are just or righteous for a wicked person can appear just or righteous. To make the judgment of significant moral transformation one must also believe that behind good actions lies a virtuous character or noble motives. One can't tell simply by looking if another person is virtuous. One might look at a person whom a particular religious group admires as a moral saint and judge that such a person's motives were ignoble. For example, if one holds the perversity explanation and learns of the astounding moral practices of a practitioner of another religion (say of stylactites or of extreme self-abnegation), one might judge that such persons were simply trying to impress their followers or future generations, incur the gods' favor in order to gain eternal bliss; supposing further that they believed that justification is by faith and not by works, they may judge that such actions are manifestations of crass self-interest and demean them rather than value them.
Consider how one would judge transformational success if one held Hick's view, H 1 . To know or reasonably judge that people are being transformed demands that we be able to peak behind the curtain. We need to know if someone is really being transformed. Since some religions place transformation (at least partly) in the next life, we can't know ante mortem if such religions are equally successful at transformation.
Other religions may make people more moral; but whether or not they are successful at spiritual transformation is beyond our ken. Even judgments of moral transformation require a peak behind the veil of actions into human motivation access to which is groggy bodies out of bed and moves them to spring into action. In the not too distant future, however, one of their school mates will gleefully inform them that it's all a lie.
After that, the candy might motivate early rising for a while but they will quickly realize that the candy will be there whether they get up early or not. The anticipation and excitement will fade, the delight diminish. They will quickly grow out of that belief and the motivating power that it once had on them. And their parents will no longer give them their candy.
After they have munched on their candy, we put on our Sunday best and rush off to Church to celebrate the resurrection of Jesus. They will learn that God loves them so much that he sent his only Son to die for them on the cross, and that he has obtained victory over sin, death and the devil, and that he has sent the Holy Spirit into their lives to secure the transactions that were settled on the cross. The view of human nature espoused by them and by Hick is that human beings are unduly devoted to the self, perhaps in bondage to the self. And they believe that there is a God who loves justice and wishes them to be just. Their transformation from self-centeredness to Godcenteredness will require, so they will come to believe, mighty acts on the part of God. Now suppose that they learn that ultimate reality cannot be discovered and that they don't know whether or not God is really a person or not, or loving and just, or even good or evil. Perhaps he/it/whatever doesn't care about their transformation from self-centeredness into Reality-centeredness (perhaps it is a category mistake to apply the property of caring to this being). Whether or not he/it/nothing is actually concerned about human transformation is an enigma. Is Reality concerned for human welfare or transformation at all? Your guess is as good as mine. We aren't allowed a peak behind that veil either. Human beings, so it seems to me, are so constructed that they need hope that their moral and spiritual efforts are not in vain. To have that hope we must believe that reality is such that it enables or even empowers us to move from self-centeredness to reality-centeredness. To believe that ultimate reality may be, for all we know, indifferent or hostile to human purposes, is demoralizing --one's best moral and spiritual efforts might in the end come to nothing. If so, it is likely that one will falter on the steps toward transformation. Human beings must believe that there is a reality that undergirds their beliefs and actions which makes human transformation possible.
The Kantian Explanation takes away that reality and offers instead appearance all the while holding that ultimate reality is a mystery. However human beings cannot center their lives around the something-we-know-not-what. Agnosticism about the ultimate structures of moral and spiritual reality defeats the hope necessary for moral and spiritual growth. The problem is that our so-called experience of God, according to this view, allows us no access to reality. The more our experiences of God are perceived as mere appearance, essentially a product of the human limits to understanding, more phantom than person or fact, the less they are perceived as revealing the nature of things and the less likely they are to achieve their transformational purpose.
Interpretive schemes concerning human welfare and meaning work best if they are believed to be true. Only thus conceived are they likely to free us from ourselves and draw us into a community of love, justice and freedom. Perhaps we "tame" God by making transformation simpler (it is by faith rather than works), or by puffing up our capacity to attain transformation (God is against whatever vices --smoking, drinking and swearing --are not temptations to those who believe), or by turning God into an advocate for one's own causes (individual or national election). There is a natural human tendency to attend to and develop those beliefs which conduce to our own interests; to that end we may create God in our own image in order to feel good about our transformational prospects.
xi There are two senses in which Hick's account may be realist. First, one's experiences of the divine are real (as experiences but not as indicative of Reality). Second, there is something (although it is illegitimate to call it an it or a thing) beyond the realm of experience that is the cause of our varying perceptions of Reality. That is, there is a belief-independent reality. (New York: Dover, 1956 ), 1-31.
xvii Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979 ) see especially 64-69.
xviii For a discussion of these and related issues, see my ìThe Explanatory Power of Theism,î International
